There is no one answer to the issue of gauging the success or failure of the Australian-led Regional Assistant Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI).
After over ten years of RAMSI's intervention, experts and lay people are beginning to use different measurements to determine the economic success of RAMSI. But in my opinion, there is more to the story than what meets the eyes.
In early 2002, I was invited to attend a Solomon Islands Update Conference
at the Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra. One of the key speakers/presenters, David Hegarty, the Convenor of
the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia (SSMG) Project at ANU, spoke and warned about the risks of
intervention, drawing from the history of Western "military intervention" and
cases after cases in Africa, Latin America etc. At the end of his
presentation, he suggested that despite the obvious risks, there is a special
case that justify intervention in the Solomon Islands, which I will call it "the human factor" or the lives of innocent people.
Months later, I was again invited to be a resource person in another seminar at ANU, where villagers and community leaders from various provinces of the Solomon Islands were brought to Canberra. The two days seminar was held for senior bureaucrats of various Departments of the Federal government and academics from ANU. During that seminar, participants from the Solomon Islands almost exclusively pleaded with Australian government officials to intervene.
Now in hindsight, after more than ten years, everyone becomes an expert and criticizes RAMSI's intervention by using economic metrics to determine "success". I don't think that anyone, including experts, can measure "success or failure" by using economic bench marks alone. RAMSI was dealing with human beings of a tribal and ethnic based society.
But RAMSI's success is a highly
debatable issue in the context of the Solomons, where leaders were
intimidated and simply watching armed thugs looting the government treasury and killing innocent people
before the intervention.
The question then was would or could you or RAMSI intervene? If we look at RAMSI's role from a human point of view (not economic or politics), we will appreciate that RAMSI had done a great job in saving lives, restoring peace, stability and law and order in the Solomons. Was or is it worth it, hell yes (from a Solomon Islander point of view).
Besides saving lives, RAMSI prevents the chance of other provinces and ethnic groups joining the ethnic conflict. Western Province, one of the economic power houses of the country, was the first to declare its intention of breaking away from the Solomon Islands. Not only that, ethnic Malaitans - third and fourth generation settlers - were not welcome, but chased out of Noro, Ringi, Gizo and various islands of the province.
Additionally, Isabel, Makira, Temotu and Rennell and Bellona provinces also expressed similar sentiment of seceding from the Solomons during the Premiers Conference in Bula, Isabel Province, in April 2000. Back then the country was fast becoming a permanent failed state.
We could all debate the pros and cons of how to maintain and sustain peace and stability that RAMSI have established. But in my view, it is the responsibility of the host government, politicians, educated citizens and the democratic institutions of the country to sort out the in-house challenges and ensure that long lasting solutions are devised, implemented and upheld.
RAMSI cannot be faulted for the past, present and future weaknesses of governing the democratic institutions of the country, which are complicated by the influence of the multi-ethnic, cultural, linguistic and island community biases and mindset of the people, whose allegiances are always to their ethnic groups before the nation.
The timing of an exit strategy for RAMSI is again a debatable issue. But the case of fixing Solomon Islands has been and will always be challenging for everyone, including our donor partners. The consistent failures of our leaders to manage the country's challenges are not always based on "incapability and incompetence", but issues that are external to modern principles of governance.
These external factors are beyond simply dealing with the normal routines of governance, but they are issues relating to ethnic and cultural values, virtues and norms that shape people's pride and identity that influenced their mindset, conduct, attitude and behavior of leaders to take or make decisions that are sometimes appeared to be out of the extra ordinary.
It is is this intersect of cultural pride and mindset that resulted in how our leaders are taking decisions that are often appeared to be abnormal, silly and crazy in the eyes of our donor partners. It is often incompatible with Western norms of governing.
In my observation of Melanesian politics, this issue cannot be fixed with Western inspired developmental strategies or measured by "economic" metrics. It is one of the problems that African nations are facing today. And I guess, Solomon Islands is no exception in this case (this is a very controversial observation but I am prepared to be corrected on this issue).
The question is - how could one measures - fixing ethic conflict on the basis of economic metrics? Could anybody out there show it to be?
After over ten years of RAMSI's intervention, experts and lay people are beginning to use different measurements to determine the economic success of RAMSI. But in my opinion, there is more to the story than what meets the eyes.
 |
| Samoan Prime Minister, Tuilaepa Lupesoliai Sailele Malielegaoi, opening the RAMSI's history in pictures at the Museum of Samoa. |
Months later, I was again invited to be a resource person in another seminar at ANU, where villagers and community leaders from various provinces of the Solomon Islands were brought to Canberra. The two days seminar was held for senior bureaucrats of various Departments of the Federal government and academics from ANU. During that seminar, participants from the Solomon Islands almost exclusively pleaded with Australian government officials to intervene.
Now in hindsight, after more than ten years, everyone becomes an expert and criticizes RAMSI's intervention by using economic metrics to determine "success". I don't think that anyone, including experts, can measure "success or failure" by using economic bench marks alone. RAMSI was dealing with human beings of a tribal and ethnic based society.
 |
| RAMSI's officers with local police officers in a join patrol at Point Cruz wharf |
The question then was would or could you or RAMSI intervene? If we look at RAMSI's role from a human point of view (not economic or politics), we will appreciate that RAMSI had done a great job in saving lives, restoring peace, stability and law and order in the Solomons. Was or is it worth it, hell yes (from a Solomon Islander point of view).
 |
| Solomon Islands women display a placard with a bold statement for peace |
Additionally, Isabel, Makira, Temotu and Rennell and Bellona provinces also expressed similar sentiment of seceding from the Solomons during the Premiers Conference in Bula, Isabel Province, in April 2000. Back then the country was fast becoming a permanent failed state.
We could all debate the pros and cons of how to maintain and sustain peace and stability that RAMSI have established. But in my view, it is the responsibility of the host government, politicians, educated citizens and the democratic institutions of the country to sort out the in-house challenges and ensure that long lasting solutions are devised, implemented and upheld.
 |
| RAMSI's officers destroying home-made guns |
RAMSI cannot be faulted for the past, present and future weaknesses of governing the democratic institutions of the country, which are complicated by the influence of the multi-ethnic, cultural, linguistic and island community biases and mindset of the people, whose allegiances are always to their ethnic groups before the nation.
The timing of an exit strategy for RAMSI is again a debatable issue. But the case of fixing Solomon Islands has been and will always be challenging for everyone, including our donor partners. The consistent failures of our leaders to manage the country's challenges are not always based on "incapability and incompetence", but issues that are external to modern principles of governance.
These external factors are beyond simply dealing with the normal routines of governance, but they are issues relating to ethnic and cultural values, virtues and norms that shape people's pride and identity that influenced their mindset, conduct, attitude and behavior of leaders to take or make decisions that are sometimes appeared to be out of the extra ordinary.
It is is this intersect of cultural pride and mindset that resulted in how our leaders are taking decisions that are often appeared to be abnormal, silly and crazy in the eyes of our donor partners. It is often incompatible with Western norms of governing.
In my observation of Melanesian politics, this issue cannot be fixed with Western inspired developmental strategies or measured by "economic" metrics. It is one of the problems that African nations are facing today. And I guess, Solomon Islands is no exception in this case (this is a very controversial observation but I am prepared to be corrected on this issue).
The question is - how could one measures - fixing ethic conflict on the basis of economic metrics? Could anybody out there show it to be?
No comments:
Post a Comment